Au/ACSC/1223AY06
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF
COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
CHINA’S STRATEGIC
AMBITIONS
And U.S. Strategy
by
Daniel J. Norman, Major,
USAFR
A
Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of
the Graduation Requirements
Instructor:
Dr. Edwina S. Campbell
Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama
April 2006
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US
government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air
Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property
of the United States government.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| Page |
DISCLAIMER……………………………………………………………………………... | ii |
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………... | iii |
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………….. | 1 |
FINANCIAL MATTERS…………………………………………………………………... | 4 |
THE MILITARY’S SUPPORTING | 15 |
THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCES…………………………………………………… | 16 |
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………….. | 20 |
APPENDIX………………………………………………………………………………… | 22 |
ENDNOTES………………………………………………………………………………... | 24 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………….. | 27 |
|
|
INTRODUCTION
The F/A-22 plods along with its proponents espousing its capabilities
and necessity for national defense. Yet, few military systems have
been so overtaken by events as has the F/A-22, that is to say the
F-22, which actually started out as the F-22 before turning into the
F/A-22. The direction of America’s military mirrors this
confusion. Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon and defense
contractors have patiently waited for China to build a sufficient
military so they could engage in a good old fashioned arms race just
like the good old days of the Soviet threat. Back then, the Pentagon
enjoyed the limelight and considered itself the keeper of peace for
the free world.
However, China is not willing to play by the traditional rules, where
we build weapon systems and they build weapon systems and defense
spending dominates budget debates. Thomas Barnett writes about a
comical want ad hung in the walls of the Pentagon after the end of
the Cold War in The Pentagon’s New Map, “ENEMY
WANTED: Mature North American Superpower seeks hostile partner for
arms-racing, Third World conflicts, and general antagonism. Must be
sufficiently menacing to convince Congress of military financial
requirements. Nuclear capability is preferred; however, non-nuclear
candidates will be considered. Send note with pictures of fleet and
air squadrons.”1
China’s intentions are to compete with America, but not on
American terms. The Cold War taught the world not to engage in an
arms race with the United States, and the 1991 Gulf War showed the
world not to engage in head to head military warfare with the United
States. So China will be content to keep a low profile, build its
economy and forge alliances while making a moderate investment in its
military. When the time is right, they will make their move, but it
will not be with traditional military weaponry, it will be with
finance and alliances to dictate the world order to their liking. A
perfect strike for China is the end of American hegemony without a
shot fired or America even knowing that the U.S. is no longer the
hyperpower it once was.
The Berlin Wall’s tumbling began the formal ending of what the
world knew had ended 45 years earlier, but dreaded admitting. The
historic window of Patton racing across southern France in a
quantifiable war (land gained, casualties, numbers of weapon
systems), fought with tangible weapons, with clear strategic
objectives sealed shut. Mechanized warfare as previously understood
expired gasping Operation DESERT STORM in its last breath. The
Vietnam War offered a glimpse of the future where a mechanized
military did not guarantee victory.
The true beginning of the end occurred at the end of World War II and
the bombing of Hiroshima. The genie escaped and danced on the
world’s fears for decades in an arms race between the United
States and Soviet Union. These fears prevented the Red Army from
charging through the Fulda Gap in Blitzkreig style because neither
side believed the other would admit defeat without escalating to
nuclear devices. While Clausewitz warns, “War is an act of
force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that
force.”2
Others argue, “philosophical principles tell us that, whenever
something reaches an ultimate point, it will turn in the opposite
direction. The invention of nuclear weapons, this ‘ultra-lethal
weapon’ which can wipe out all mankind, has plunged mankind
into an existential trap of its own making.”3
Clearly an alternative to the World War II style of total war needed
to be developed if war ever had a chance to survive.
The United States’ experience with unconventional warfare goes
back to the founding of the country. Despite this fact, since WWII,
the U.S. has mostly disregarded warfare outside of the
conventional/nuclear arena. During the Cold War, one of the most
fascinating wars ever fought ended in defeat handed to one of the
superpowers by an enemy that possessed a small fraction of the
industrial base. Even today Vietnam references haunt the Iraq War.
Although the Soviet Union suffered its own Vietnam in Afghanistan, it
is not as compelling in hindsight because it contributed to the fall
of the Soviet Union and occurred at the twilight of its power. The
Soviet Union could no longer afford its operations in Afghanistan.
In contrast, the Vietnam War occurred at the height of America’s
power and the U.S. had the economic wherewithal to continue
operations. America simply chose not to pursue the war any further.
Although a host of material has been written about the war’s
whys and hows, but the most important fact was that a Third World
nation with limited infrastructure, technology and economic power,
with assistance from other major powers (People’s Republic of
China and the Soviet Union) was able to drive out the most powerful
country in the world. The major conclusion is superior military
capability is not required to win a war if other pressures can be
leveraged against the enemy. This fact was not lost on the
Afghanistan mujahadeen forces fighting the Soviet Union nor many
other military scholars that has philosophized about how to defeat
the United States. The battlefields of the Afghan reinforced a
warfare technique mostly ignored by the United States (except during
the Vietnam War) in the course of the Cold War missile counts, but
used by those clearly overmatched—terrorism.
The Soviet Union’s death left the world in a unipolar
unequilibrium. While the U.S. searched for a partner at the arms
race ball and spied China, China realized that dancing toe-to-toe was
no way for an eagle and dragon to dance. China would engage in an
arms race only if it benefited China. Otherwise, China would engage
in an alternative form of warfare where the dragon could lead and
make the eagle dance to its tune. Identifying America’s
weaknesses and creating a long-term strategy to exploit them are the
keys to China’s strategy. Thinking further into the future
than their adversary is a key to the Chinese strategy.
FINANCIAL MATTERS
Ultimately, most developed countries’ center of gravity is
their economy. Without a healthy economy a country cannot produce an
advanced conventional military. Without a viable military or
economy, diplomatic effectiveness degrades. Part of the U.S.
strategy has been to create a military that no other nation could
possibly compete with on an equal level. Since a traditional arms
race with the U.S. could be too costly, China set its sights on
attacking the U.S. economic and diplomatic efforts and using its
growing economy make modest increases in its military budget to
increase the pressure on the U.S. to spend more on military programs.
An arms race with the U.S. would serve China’s purposes only
insofar as the Cold War’s arms race served the U.S. The U.S.
and Soviet Union never crossed the line of warfare for fear of the
catastrophic results, so the Cold War was ultimately won not by the
player with the most toys, but by the one who did not go broke first.
The U.S. spent the Soviet Union to death. The average growth in
Soviet national income from 1951-1955 was 11.2 percent (annual
percentage per Five Year plan). The national income growth steadily
decreased to 3.5 percent during 1981-1985:4
The continuing decline in the rate of growth confronts the
bureaucratic leaders of the Soviet Union with an agonizing choice.
When the rate of growth is at or above 4-4.5 per cent they are able
to increase simultaneously investments (industrialization and
modernization), military spending (in the pursuit and maintenance of
‘military parity’ with imperialism), and the standard of
living of the masses, although at a modest rate. If this rate drops
to 3 per cent or below, the simultaneous pursuit of these three
objectives, the goal of the bureaucracy since the death of Stalin,
becomes impossible. The slowdown in economic growth is accompanied
by an even clearer slowdown in consumer spending.5
President Reagan drove the final nail in the coffin with increased
military spending in the 1980s. He reestablished the B-1 program,
initiated the MX missile program and conceived the ultimate defense
weapons program in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly
known in the press as the “Star Wars” initiative. The
Soviet Union protested SDI mostly because it presented the Soviet
Union with an insurmountable task to achieve. To invigorate the
Soviet economy, Gorbachev introduced Perestroika, a form of limited
capitalism. But the damage had been done, and the Soviet system
collapsed upon the weight of its struggling finances.
The lesson learned here is that in age of war since Hiroshima, fiscal
capabilities are more important than missile capabilities. Sun Tzu
indicated that direct battle was not the only option to wage war:
Achieving victory in every battle is not absolute perfection:
neutralizing an adversary’s forces without battle is absolute
perfection.
So, the best military strategy is to crush their plans, following
this is to crush their diplomatic relations, and following this is to
crush their forces; worst of all is to besiege their city
fortifications.6
The U.S. has a successful history in this regard as show in the
previous Cold War example. The U.S. never engaged in direct conflict
with the Soviet Union, but broke the Soviet Union’s resistance
without fighting.
However, with China, America’s strategy has morphed from
engagement under President Clinton into “congagement,”
7
a combination of containment and engagement. “There is a
fundamental lack of consensus on what strategy can best achieve our
purposes. Routinely every four years, and additionally whenever
there is a crisis, our debate on China policy begins anew.”8
The U.S. seems to have difficulty creating a long-term strategy on
how to react to the rise of China since the end of the Cold War. If
the debate on China follows remains indecisive, it could be possible
that the U.S. will not approach the subject until China has not
necessarily attained its goals, but positioned itself in such a way
that America has limited options for recourse.
China developed a strategy to create a multi-polar world and against
American hegemony that leads with building economic dependence to
leverage against America and aid in building alliances throughout the
world. It is making a modest investment in its military as an
alliance tool and to provide the Pentagon concerns about China’s
military capability. “China [aspires] to be a major
international power that cannot be intimidated by [any] other power
or consortium of powers. It seeks to maximize its own ‘comprehensive
national power’ while maintaining a peaceful external
environment. By ‘comprehensive national power,’ China’s
strategists mean economic power, political/diplomatic power,
propaganda or ‘informational power’ and military power.
Beijing’s strategists believe that given strong power in these
areas, China will have the ‘power to compel’ (qiang zhi
li) other nations to do its bidding.”9
Part of Washington’s predicament is that it does not know if
China is a friend or foe, a strategic ally, strategic competitor, or
outright enemy, or a combination of these. Without a reference for
the relationship it is difficult to determine a coherent policy.
China prides itself on its secrecy. This secrecy fosters confusion
and mistrust in Washington. Beijing enjoys freedom of movement
because of this confusion in Washington called congagement.
Although China is not a traditional military competitor, that does
not mean it is not a threat. In testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee in 2000, Dr. Larry Wortzel, of the Heritage
Foundation, explained, that China desires, “a world that is
based on multipolarity. They oppose military blocs, they oppose
power politics and they oppose agendaism…’agendaism’
is code work [sic] for the United States.” Agendaism is what
the Chinese consider the American agenda being pushed by the U.S.
from American hegemony. Dr Wortzel also explained that China’s
economy was to play a major part in this effort of ending American
hegemony and creating a multipolar world. 10
In the same hearing, Dr. Michael Pillsbury, of National Defense
University, stated that China is going to make every effort not to
draw the attention of the U.S. and bide its time and patiently wait
for American power to diminish. “If I had to nominate for you
the most important priority that the Chinese have for their long-term
strategic intentions, it is not to provoke a reaction to China’s
economic growth or the growth in Chinese power...Over the next 20 or
30 years, Chinese strategy toward the United States can afford to be
somewhat passive because we are—we Americans are already
declining and we are going to amount to only one of five powers in 20
or 25 years without China doing anything about it.”11
China intends to use its growing economy as the cornerstone to its
grand strategy: “Continued strong economic performance,
combined with rising nationalism and confidence, could lead China to
translate its economic gains into fielding an increasingly capable
military. It could use its economic weight, backed by military
power, to attempt to dictate the terms of foreign security and
economic interactions with its trading partners.”12
China plans on using policy (economic and otherwise) to end American
hegemony. While Clausewitz states, “War is merely continuation
of policy by other means,”13
It could be argued that Sun Tzu would have rebutted that policy is
war by other means because Clausewitz argues, “war is thus an
act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”14
So if a country can compel, or force, an enemy to do its will
without bloodshed, is it war or is it policy? This again pushes the
question scholars have been trying to answer for centuries, what is
the definition of war?
What then defines attacks that are not linked to military operations
but are acts of war? According to two People’s Liberation Army
Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui:
‘Non-military war operations,’ extends our understanding
of exactly what constitutes a state of war to each and every field of
human endeavor, far beyond what can be embraced by the term ‘military
operations.’ This type of extension is the natural result of
the fact that human beings will use every conceivable means to
achieve their goals. While Americans are in the lead in every field
of military theory, they were not able to take the lead in proposing
this new concept of war.15
In America’s defense, the U.S. is not void of thinking outside
of traditional military operations. For example, the freezing of
assets in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) highlights a form of
non-military operations. However, depending on how one defines
non-military warfare operations the boundaries of non-military
warfare operations wavers. For example, an economic embargo could be
an economic use of power according to one nation, along the lines of
Clausewitzian thinking, or it could be an act of war if you widen the
definition of warfare in a Sun Tzuian way of war as previously
defined.
Outside of terrorism, Washington has a narrower definition of warfare
operations than China. Long before September 11, 2001, George Soros,
a financial speculator, engaged in what some Chinese say was
financial terrorism, destroying economies around the world. This
statement initially seems bordering on the ridiculous, however,
American self-satisfaction blinds the U.S. on occasion to the plight
of the world. “The typical characteristics of terrorism
including being transnational, concealed, without rules, and
tremendously destructive, have given us reason to call it financial
terrorism.”16
In fact according to some Chinese, George Soros ranks as high as
Osama bin Laden as a terrorist.17
For a long time both military people and politicians have become
accustomed to employing a certain mode of thinking, that is, the
major factor posing a threat to national security is the military
power of an enemy state or potential enemy state. However, the wars
and major incidents which have occurred during the last ten years of
the 20th century have provided to us in a calm and
composed fashion proof that the opposite is true: military threats
are already often no longer the major factors affecting national
security. Even though they are the same ancient territorial
disputes, nationality conflicts, religious clashes, and the
delineation of spheres of power in human history, and are still
several major agents of people waging war from opposite directions,
these traditional factors are increasingly becoming more intertwined
with grabbing resources, contending for markets, controlling capital,
trade sanctions, and other economic factors, to the extent that they
are even becoming secondary to these factors. They comprise a new
pattern which threatens the political, economic and military security
of a nation or nations. This pattern possibly does not have the
slightest military hue viewed from the outside, and thus they have
been called by certain observers “secondary wars” or
“analogous wars.” However, the destruction which they do
in the areas attacked are absolutely not secondary to pure military
wars. In this area, we only need mention the names of lunatics such
as George Soros, bin Laden, Escobar, [Chizuo] Matsumoto, and Kevin
Mitnick.18
China appears to be following this course of action. Its growing
industrial economy compels China to grab resources, contend for
markets and control capital and trade sanctions. Specifically, China
has accumulated over $750 billion in federal reserves, about
two-thirds of which is in American government and corporate debt.19
The mounting reserves continue to raise eyebrows since, “China’s
holdings of dollar reserves are already far greater than makes sense
for China.”20
This reserve China enjoys leads to a complex relationship between
China and America.
Professor of Economics Paul Krugman, noted in the New York Times
on September 5, 2003, how much power the Chinese yuan has over the
U.S. economy, specifically in the price of goods and employment. An
undervalued yuan creates artificially low prices on Chinese products
which in turn takes market share from U.S. goods in the American
economy. To compensate, American companies “outsource”
production to China and other countries where labor is cheap.
Outsourcing leads to unemployment in the U.S. as the manufacturing
jobs go overseas. Krugman contends that President George Bush asked
the Chinese for economic help during the recession of the early
2000’s. Krugman specifically states Bush requested help from
Beijing by revaluing the yuan, “which some business groups
claim is a major problem for American companies.”21
In 2003 Bush sent Secretary of Treasury John Snow to Beijing
seeking an increase in yuan value, but was denied.22
China could deny Snow’s request because the United States
bargained from a position of weakness. It already required China’s
help in dealing with the six party talks concerning North Korea’s
nuclear program, among other Asian matters. “Diplomats
acknowledge that China holds most of the cards in negotiations over
North Korea's nuclear arsenal, the democratization of Myanmar,
realignment of the former communist Central Asian states and even -
indirectly - prospects for reconciliation between India and
Pakistan.”23
Outside of Asia, “the United States now needs China’s
help on issues such as counterterrorism, non proliferation, the
reconstruction of Iraq, and the maintenance of stability in the
Middle East. More and more, Washington has also started to seek
China’s cooperation in fields such as trade and finance,
despite increased friction over currency exchange rates, intellectual
property rights, and the textile trade.”24
Also, Chinese central banks were one of the main purchasers of
Treasury bills to finance the America’s trade deficit.25
“Nobody is quite sure what would happen if the Chinese
suddenly switched to, say, euros—a two-point jump in mortgage
rates?—but it’s not an experiment anyone wants to try.”26
A small yuan revaluation finally came two years later in 2005;
however, Beijing, not Washington, still had the biggest influence on
the world economy. Three facts support this claim. First, China
continues to finance the American “consumer and its government
by buying Treasury bonds,”27
which keeps bond yields low.
Secondly, China minimized the effects on the world economy from oil
prices doubling in a year’s time. Inflation remained low and
global growth continued because instead of an interruption of supply
of oil, Chinese demand drove the price up. With the oil China
produces cheaper goods which offset the price of oil.28
Additionally, “the threat that firms in developed countries
might shift offshore also helps to keep a lid on wages and hence
inflation.”29
Finally, “while prices of most goods are falling, housing
prices are soaring in many countries.”30
Cheaper goods from China allowed central banks in the U.S. to meet
low inflation goals without raising interest rates. Lower interest
rates encouraged borrowing, therefore capital flowed into mortgages,
instead of traditional inflation measured in the consumer price
index. And again, the American bond yields were low because of
Chinese demand, which in turn holds down the yuan.31
The United States has to consider what would happen if consumption of
Chinese products grew outside of the American market. Free from the
dependence on the American market, China would not need to fund the
U.S. debt. China has a potential market within its own borders.
“Chinese national saving rate is high relative to
international experience…on average 37 percent between 1978
and 1995, compared to an international average of almost 21
percent…China’s national savings rate was 10 percentage
points higher than what would be expected.”32
Potential markets also exist outside China. Former Princeton
professor and current Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board Ben
Bernanke coined the term “global savings glut,” to
explain America’s deficit. Countries such as Germany, Japan,
and oil producing countries are saving rather than spending.33
So the flow of money goes from the U.S. to these countries national
and personal savings. If they started to spend on Chinese goods
instead of savings, China’s economy could continue to expand
without so much dependence on the American market. Also, if the
world in general moved away from savings (buying U.S. securities)
interest rates would increase and a cascading effect of negative
consequences for the American economy would ensue. If Bernanke is
incorrect about the global savings glut, then U.S. fiscal policy must
be scrutinized for causing the imbalance.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis confirmed China’s emphasis on
economic strength. It saw many of the economies in the region
damaged. Malaysia’s ringgit suffered during the crisis due to
currency trading, specifically George Soros’ hedge fund Quantum
Fund, according to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. “Hedge
funds such as Soros’s Quantum Fund now can mobilize billions of
dollars to bet against currencies, often by selling a currency
forward in the hope that they can buy it back later at a cheaper
rate.”34
Qiao and Wang vilify Soros in their 1999 wrote a book on the future
of warfare, Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao and Wang comparing him
to the likes of Osama bin Laden:
During the 1990's, and concurrent with the series of military actions
launched by nonprofessional warriors and non-state organizations, we
began to get an inkling of a non-military type of war which is
prosecuted by yet another type of non-professional warrior. This
person is not a hacker in the general sense of the term, and also is
not a member of a quasi-military organization. Perhaps he or she is a
systems analyst or a software engineer, or a financier with a large
amount of mobile capital or a stock speculator. He or she might even
perhaps be a media
mogul who controls a wide variety of media, a famous columnist or the
host of a TV program. His or her philosophy of life is different
from that of certain blind and inhuman terrorists. Frequently, he or
she has a firmly held philosophy of life and his or her faith is by
no means inferior to Osama bin Laden's in terms of its fanaticism.
Moreover, he or she does not lack the motivation or courage to enter
a fight as necessary. Judging by this kind of standard, who can say
that George Soros is not a financial terrorist?35
Qiao and Wang apply Soros’s techniques, combined with other
non-military warfare operations (in this case cyber attacks), to
create a scenario where an enemy is defeated without any military
action;
Supposing a war broke out between two developed nations already
possessing full information technology, and relying upon traditional
methods of operation, the attacking side would generally employ the
modes of great depth, wide front, high strength, and
three-dimensionality to launch a campaign assault against the enemy.
Their method does not go beyond satellite reconnaissance, electronic
countermeasures, large-scale air attacks plus precision attacks,
ground outflanking, amphibious landings, air drops behind enemy
lines…the result is not that the enemy nation proclaims defeat
but rather one returns with one’s own spears and feathers.
However, by using the combination method a completely different
scenario and game can occur: if the attacking side secretly musters
large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware of this
at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets then
after causing a financial crisis buries a computer virus and hacker
detachment in the opponent’s computer system in advance, while
at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so
that the civilian electricity network, and mass media network are
completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into
social panic street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally
the forceful bearing down by the army and military means are utilized
in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable
peace treaty. This admittedly does not attain to the domain spoken
of by Sun Zi, wherein “the other army is subdued without
fighting.” However, it can be considered to be “subduing
the other army through clever options.” It is very clear who
was superior and who was inferior when comparing these two methods of
operation.
This is, however, only a thought. However, it is certainly a
feasible thought.36
In 1999 this was only a thought, in 2006 it is in practice, while
some consider Unrestricted Warfare propaganda, it appears with
the increase in federal reserves the Chinese are following its
blueprint. Qiao and Wang’s vision of the future would not be
so alarming except for in 2004 China put non-military warfare into
policy. China’s 2004 National Defense Policy states, “The
forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanized to
informationalization. Informationalization has become the key factor
in enhancing the warfighting capability of the armed forces.
Confrontation between systems has become the principle feature of
confrontation on the battlefield. Asymmetrical, non-contiguous and
non-linear operations have become important patterns of operations.”37
The idea of China launching a financial attack or using financial
coercion against the United States would not create a precedent.
President Eisenhower used financial coercion on Britain, during the
Suez Canal crisis in 1956. And then during the Asian financial
crisis of 1997-1998, the U.S. was accused of financial attacks again.
On October 29, 1956, Israel backed by England and France in a secret
agreement attacked Egypt.38
The U.S. administration was furious and led to United States giving,
“the British Treasury a virtual ultimatum: as Londoners recall
it, [the U.S.] posed the simple choice of an immediate cease-fire or
war on the pound, with not a dollar to be had for oil suppliers…[the
U.S,] now would block their path to dollars from the International
Monetary Fund, put off their hopes of credit from our [U.S.]
Export-Import Bank, and make no effort to align our central bankers
behind sterling. If they persisted, they would face a forced
devaluation, followed by petrol rationing. [U.S.] threats were
underlined by the week’s run on the pound.”39
The British acquiesced and called for a cease fire.40
The United States is still an economic powerhouse and the biggest
economy and has a big influence on world finances. Qiao and Wang
noted America’s ability to manipulate finances during the
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.
The United States immediately opposed a Japanese proposal to set up
an Asian monetary fund. Instead, the United States advocated the
implementation of a rescue plan, with strings attached...The
implication was that Asian countries should be forced to accept the
economic liberalization policy promoted by the United States…A
demand such as this is armed robbery. It gives the developed
countries, with the United States as their leader, the opportunity to
gain unrestricted access to another country's markets, or to get in
and clear out some space there. It is little different from a
disguised form of economic occupation.41
More important than whether the U.S. planned this “economic
invasion,” but that the perception the U.S. did. Two messages
from this 1999 passage could be: 1) The Chinese need to build an
economy that can compete with America on these terms. 2) Do not
trust American financial aid offers.
THE MILITARY’S SUPPORTING ROLE
China’s military “buildup” plays a supporting role
in economic and diplomatic strategy. First of all, the so called
military buildup is not as much of a buildup as it would appear.
With a growing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) an increase in military
spending will follow because more funds are available. China’s
2004 military spending was between 2.3 and 2.8%, of GDP, according to
a 2005 RAND study.42
U.S. military spending is at 3.9%of GDP. In 2004 China spent
between $69 billion and $78 billion for China versus $430 billion for
the United States in 2001 dollars.43
The debate over Chinese military spending misses the point for the
most part. The first reaction to a Chinese military build up is to
counter with a larger build up. The U.S. strategy is to have a
military without peer. How much spending with this require? If the
Chinese intend to get the U.S. to overspend on the military this
plays well into China’s intentions. If China can push the
Pentagon into a perceived arms race, it would exacerbate the current
account deficit Washington is contending with. It is odd to think
that in the long run China would finance this military spending and
then reap the rewards when the notes came due. The U.S. deficit
could reach as high as 13% of GDP by 2010.44
The military budget must also compete with other items in the budget
such as GWOT, Social Security and other programs.
While some military and economic analysts see a peaceful reunion of
China and Taiwan, other military analysts contend that a U.S.
military build up is necessary to defend Taiwan in case of a Chinese
invasion. While much is written about how the war would start and
what courses of action would need to take place to start the war, the
outcome will most likely not involve traditional military weaponry.
Qiao and Wang address this in their book and concluded that nuclear
weapons ended the era of traditional warfare. “Philosophical
principles tell us that, whenever something reaches an ultimate
point, it will turn in the opposite direction.”45
If the U.S. enters an arms race with China it could find itself on
the short end of a Cold War much like the Soviet Union did.
Unwilling to use its military power to destroy the U.S. and the
world, the weight of the Soviet military, among other reasons,
eventually crushed the Soviet economy and ultimately the Soviet Union
itself.
China can use its economy to build its military and aid its
diplomatic efforts. Russia is strapped for cash and has military
weaponry to sell. China is buying. “China constitutes the
largest single importer of post-Soviet Russian arms and military
equipment, with purchases ranging between 30% and 50% of Russia's
entire annual deliveries.”46
Traditional allies of the U.S., such as the European Union and
Israel, have considered selling arms to China until the U.S. put
sufficient diplomatic pressure on them to thwart the contracts.
47
THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCES
One of China’s responses to what they consider American
hegemony is to build alliances excluding the United States. “China
seeks to place itself at the center of a web of strategic
partnerships in Asia and around the world designed to weaken United
States alliances and American leadership.”48
There are two specific organizations China has become
involved in to thwart U.S. hegemony. The first is the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), more specifically, ASEAN+3 since
China was not an original member, but one of the “+3.”
ASEAN started in 1967 as a political, economic and
cultural organization of five Southeast Asian countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei) and
added four other nations from 1984 to 1999 (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar,
Cambodia).49
China joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 for dialogue and
consultation and then increased its presence as an ASEAN+3 member in
1997 for coordination and cooperation.50
In 2005, ASEAN, “signed an accord with China
that will create an open market of 2 billion people by 2010 to
compete with Europe and the United States. The pact aims to drop
most tariffs over the next five years in a move that some analysts
have said is a sign Beijing may be moving to undercut America’s
vast economic influence over the region”51
To apply more pressure on the U.S., ASEAN is negotiating with Japan
(the world’s second largest economy) on how to cut tariffs.52
By building alliances China hopes to create a
multi-polar world. “Beijing’s preference for a
‘[multi]-polar world’ is another way of saying that China
seeks to create a world that is able to reject the particular type of
value-based leadership exercised by the Unites States. Beijing seeks
to shape a world in which the U.S. position is much weaker and U.S.
policy is changed to take into account the other poles of
power…Beijing seeks to shape a world in which America’s
position is much weaker than it is today and where U.S. leadership is
weakened to accommodate the desires of other competing poles of
power, specifically the desires and interests of China.”53
Another important organization for China is the Shanghai
Cooperative Organization (SCO). Chartered shortly before 9/11 in
June 2001, the organization’s purpose is to, “strengthen
confidence-building and disarmament,” between China, Russia and
four Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan.54
Shortly after 9/11, America descended upon Central Asia for aid in
the execution of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.55
All four of the Central Asia states provided
varying assistance to the U.S. 56
China’s distaste for American hegemony most likely makes
America’s relationship with Central Asia concerning for China.
Russia is not too fond of a growing U.S. presence in Central Asia,
either. “One initiative that core members China and Russia
agree on, experts say, is to squeeze US influence – which
peaked after 9/11.”57
China and Russia are now leveraging the SCO relationship to put
pressure on American presence. “The SCO
wants to rid the region of the American
military presence altogether. [In July 2005] it called for a deadline
by which the America-led coalition in Afghanistan should remove its
airforce bases in Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan.”58
China is currently trying to negotiate a pipeline to
transport Caspian Sea oil through Kazahkstan.59
However, the U.S. would rather the oil flow west toward the
Mediterranean Sea to feed world markets.60
With its growing industrial economy, China’s
thirst for oil continues to soar, and Kazahkstan is not the only
region of the world China is exploring for supply. Latin America is
an area that has recently received Beijing’s attention. In
November 2004, Chinese president Hu Jintao, “announced $20
billion in new investments for oil and gas exploration and other
projects [in Brazil]…During his visit to Latin America and the
Caribbean last January [2004], signed various trade and oil-supply
agreements with Venezuela…trade between China and Latin
America has quintupled since 1999, reaching almost $40 billion by the
end of last year [2004]…Latin America has continued to benefit
greatly from China’s economic growth, in terms of both
investment and trade. [In 2004], China invested $1.4 billion in the
region; it is now the main impetus for export growth for many Latin
American states.”61
Other relationships China has fostered that create
problems for the U.S. include Sudan and Iran. “China is in a
lucrative partnership that delivers billions of dollars in
investment, oil revenue and weapons—as well as diplomatic
protection—to a government accused by the United States of
genocide in Darfur…and is listed by Washington as a state
supporter of terrorism.62
The U.S. would like to leverage the UN against Sudan but China uses
its veto power at the UN to protect Sudan. With Iran, China gets oil
and natural gas and Iran gets protection at the UN while building its
nuclear program.63
China is trying to stay out of America’s
military sights as Dr. Pillsbury testified in 2000. “Bu chu
tou,” or “don’t stick your head up,” was Deng
Xiaoping’s reply when communist leaders prodded him to crow as
the largest communist country after the Soviet Union collapsed.
China wishes to build its economic and military capabilities without
drawing attention. A conflict over Taiwan would blow China’s
cover because Deng used another term to describe China’s
strategy, “tao guang yang hui,” which roughly translates
to “bide our time and build up our capabilities.”64
Pillsbury described Chinese intentions by
paraphrasing a young Chinese scholar. “He said, our big
dangerous period is not the present time. China will face its true
dangerous decade from 2020 to 2030…By 2020 the Americans are
going to catch on with the idea that China is surpassing America’s
economy. We will be bigger than the Americans in our world economic
power and other measures of power as well…We need to keep the
Americans, you might say, happy and not perceiving a challenge and
especially not a threat from China.”65
Dr. Wortzel adds that the Chinese military is not capable of a
confrontation with the U.S.66
A war with the U.S. would set China back on several
fronts:
The outcome of any war between the United States and
China would be devastating for Chinese interests. As General Zhu
Chenghu recently observed, China has ‘no capability to fight a
conventional war against the United States.’ Indeed, China
would face near inevitable defeat, with the military political and
economic costs far outweighing any costs incurred by the United
States. [Besides a significant military defeat] China would lose
access to Western technologies for many years after the war. It
would also lose its peaceful international environment and risk its
‘peaceful rise’ as its economy shifted to long-term
war-footing and its budget contended with a protracted U.S.-Chinese
arms race, undermining domestic infrastructure development and
long-term civilian and defense technology development. Finally, the
political costs would be prohibitive. A military loss to the United
States could well destroy the nationalist credentials of the Chinese
Communist Party and cause its collapse.67
In his book, The World is Flat: A Brief History
of the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Friedman makes another
argument against a Sino-U.S. war over Taiwan. He lists his Dell
notebook computer’s fourteen major components and accessories.
These components and accessories are supplied by factories and
companies that are in or are headquartered in fourteen different
coutry. Eight of the companies are Taiwanese owned Chinese
factories. Extrapolating this example, Friedman argues that the
world cannot afford for a war involving China and Taiwan.68
Taiwan will not declare independence any time soon. The status quo,
although convoluted, works best for all involved. America cannot
afford to go to war so it will pressure Taiwan to retain its current
status of autonomous yet not independent. China is trying to appease
America for the moment so it does not with for a military
confrontation, but on the same hand refuses to grant Taiwan’s
independence. All these forces box Taiwan into its current status.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, China’s strategic goal is to
limit hegemony. In other words, China wishes to create an
environment to counterbalance American unipolarity. China intends to
leverage its economic growth against the U.S. and also foster
alliances built on its economic power that also counter American
hegemony. China’s military build up does not significantly
challenge the United States.
China has taken specific economic steps to achieve
these goals. It built an economy that the United States and the rest
of the world depend on. It has also accumulated sizeable savings as
previously stated in terms of debt and foreign exchange, mostly U.S.,
as leverage.
From its economic position, China has built
relationships around the world to counter American hegemony. Asia
receives a significant amount of Beijing’s attention. But
Latin America and other parts of the world are objects of Beijing’s
attention also. These relationships are fostered to build a
multi-polar world to offset American hegemony.
Finally, China’s military build up plays a
supporting role in this endeavor. As China’s economy grows, it
can afford to put more capital into its military. Military
investment by China puts pressure on Washington to increase its
military budget while Washington searches for areas to cut its
federal budget as it stands. To pay for its federal budget, America
turns to foreign purchasers of U.S. debt. Ironically China is one of
the major buyers.
China’s efforts will produce dividends.
American dependence on Chinese capital will continue to grow if U.S.
debt is not addressed and brought back down to a point where
financial choices in Beijing cannot significantly affect the American
economy. Also, the stronger the Chinese economy becomes the greater
the influence its diplomatic voice will carry.
The one question I received more than any
other while writing this paper was, “What should America’s
response be? What can America do to stop this, or should it?”
If I had a good answer I would offer that up right now. However, I
do not.
The United Kingdom was the last empire to
face a slow steady decline. It made a distinct choice at the
commencement of World War I not to back Germany, but to throw its hat
in with France hoping it could thwart Germany’s rise.
The best position during war is that of
supplier or financier of the war. While other countries were
spending their fortune fighting the war, the U.S. supplied capital
for the war efforts. World War II replayed this same scenario to
some extent. The United States produced arms and built a strong
economic base from its industrial capabilities developed in the first
half of the twentieth century.
In The World is Flat, the U. S.
economy is no longer based on industry. Today, the world wants three
things, cheap labor to produce cheaper goods, information, and
innovation. Cheap labor cannot be found in the U.S., information can
be outsourced, leaving the U.S. with innovation. America must focus
on its educational capabilities to build its market share in the
innovation market.
The only other issue the United States
could possibly exploit with China is world opinion. As stated
earlier, China is willing to foster relationships with countries that
are not revered in the world community such as Sudan and Iran. When
facts like these are brought up, Americans themselves are usually the
first to air dirty laundry about who and what relationships the U.S.
has entertained making efforts to exploit this issue difficult.
The next question is how much does world
opinion even matter? For all the trade the U.S. enjoys with China,
it is hard to envision what it would take for the Americas to curb
their appetite for cheap Chinese goods. Cutting the Chinese market
out would create a decrease in supply and therefore an increase in
consumer prices leading to inflation.
If it is a foregone conclusion that China
will create a more evenly balanced multi-polar world with itself as
one of the major players, what would China consider victory. This is
nearly impossible to say because China is a closed society that tries
to control what information is revealed about its true intentions if
China itself knows what they would consider victory. Denying the
enemy knowledge of your true intentions is key. Without knowing
which way China plans on going (military buildup or economic
dominance), the U.S. cannot build a coherent defense.
What do I think victory would be for China?
If China can destabilize the U.S. dollar to the point that oil is
traded in yuan instead of greenbacks or euros, I think China would be
satisfied with its efforts. What can the U.S. do about it? I’m
not sure what exactly the United States could do, but I am sure the
measures that would need to be taken would be too difficult for any
politician to take and still get re-elected.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. “Clausewitz.” In
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
. Edited by Peter Paret, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig
and Felix Gilbert. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986:
77.
Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare
(Beijing, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), 26.
on-line Internet, 14 November 2005, available from
http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf.
Ernest Mandel, Beyond Perestroika: The Future of
Gorbachev’s USSR ed. and trans. Gus Fagan (New York:
Verso, 1989), 3.
Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Sweet and Sour: Recipe for a
New China Policy, RAND. on-line Internet, available from
www.rand.org/.webloc.
US China Commission. United States-China Relations
and Strategic Perceptions. USCC Testimony, 2001. on-line
Internet, 26 October 2005. available from
http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/teswor.htm.
US House. China’s Strategic Intentions and
Goals: Hearing before the House Committee of Armed Services.
106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000.
“The military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2005.” Department of Defense Annual
Report to Congress, 2005. on-line Internet, 23 December 2005.
available from
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.
David Lague. “Coming to terms with China’s
ascent.” International Herald Tribune, 7 November 2005.
on-line Internet, 14 December 2005. available from
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/06/news/rchinover.php.
Clive Crook. “Our Faith-Based Future,” The
Atlantic Monthly. 296. no. 5. December 2005. n.p., on-line, 20
December 2005, available from
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/faith-based-future.
Boyd, Alan. “ASEAN, China all smiles for now.”
Asia Times, 3 December 2005, on-line Internet, 18 December
2005, available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FL03Ae02.html.
Wang Jisi. “China’s Search for Stability
With America.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005,
84 no. 5, 39-40.
“How China runs the world economy,” The
Economist, 28 July 2005. n.p., on-line, Internet, 8 December
2005, available from
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4223552.
Louis Kuijs. Investment and Saving in China.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3633. Beijing, China:
World Bank, 2005.
“The great thrift shift.” The Economist,
22 September 2005, on-line. Internet, 21 December 2005, available
from
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_QQTRPNR&no_na_tran=1.
Dean Honeycutt. “Those ‘evil’
currency traders.” World & I, March 98, 13 no. 3,
pg 64. On-line. EBSCOHost, 14 November 2005.
Information office of the State Council, People’s
Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004.
Beijing, 2004. 20 December 2005, online Internet, available from
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/.
RAND Study Predicts China’s Defense Spending
is Lower Than Previous Outside Estimates. RAND Corp.. 2005.
on-line Internet, 21 December 2005, available from
http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/05.19.html.
Foreign exchange markets. BIS 75th
annual report chapter V. Bank for International Settlements, 2005.
on-line Internet, 26 October 2005, available from
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2005e5.pdf.
David Isenberg. “How Russia keeps China armed.”
Asia Times, 19 November 2004, on-line Internet, 27 December
2005, available from
http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FK19Ag02.html.
Association
of Southeast Asian Nations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,
online Internet, 18 December 2004, available from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN
50
CIA
- The World Factbook - Appendix B. on-line Internet,
18 December 2005, available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html.
Alan Boyd. “China adds its might to ASEAN.”
Asia Times, 1 December 2005, on-line Internet, 18 December
2005, available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FL01Ad08.html.
US China Commission. United States-China Relations
and Strategic Perceptions. USCC Testimony, 2001, on-line
Internet, 26 October 2005, available from
http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/teswor.htm.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Democratic
Republic of China. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. on-line
Internet, 19 December 2005, available from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm
Susan L. Clark-Sestak. U.S. Bases in Central Asia.
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003, 3-5.
Fred Weir. “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO
of the East’.” The Christian Science Monitor, 26
October 2005, on-line Internet, 26 October 2005, available from
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1026/p04s01-woeu.htm.
“Suppression, China, Oil,” The
Economist, 7 July 2005, n.p., on-line Internet, 19
December 2005, available from
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4158711.
David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global
Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, 84
no. 5, 29.
Christopher Pala, “China eyes share of Kazakh
oil: Canada judge OKs bid for fields,” The Washington
Times, world section pg. A19, on-line. EBSCOhost, 19 December
2005.
David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global
Hunt for Energy.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, 84
no. 5, 29.
Peter S. Goodman, “China Invests Heavily In
Sudan’s Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on
Villagers,” The Washington Post, 23 December 2004, A01,
on-line Internet, 1 January 2006, available from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.
Antoaneta Beziova, “China-Iran tango threatens US
leverage,” Asia Times. 30 November 2004, on-line
Internet, available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FK30Ak01.html.
US House. China’s Strategic Intentions and
Goals: Hearing before the House Committee of Armed Services.
106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000.
US China Commission. United States-China Relations
and Strategic Perceptions. USCC Testimony, 2001, on-line
Internet, 26 October 2005, available from
http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/teswor.htm.
Robert S. Ross. “Assessing the China Threat.”
National Interest, Fall 2005, on-line. EBSCOHost, 24 October
2005.
Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief
History of the Twenty-First Century (New York, N.Y.: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2005), 416-417.
Bibliography
ASEAN. On-line Internet, 18 December 2005. Available from
Association
of Southeast Asian Nations - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Barnett, Thomas P.M. The Pentagon’s New Map. New York,
N.Y.: Putnam, 2004.
Beziova, Antoaneta. “China-Iran tango threatens US leverage.”
Asia Times, 30 November 2004. On-line. Internet, 23 December
2005. Available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FK30Ak01.html.
Boyd, Alan. “ASEAN, China all smiles for now.” Asia
Times, 3 December 2005.
Boyd, Alan. “China adds its might to ASEAN.” Asia
Times, 1 December 2005. On-line Internet, 18 December 2005.
Available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FL01Ad08.html.
CIA
- The World Factbook - Appendix B. On-line.
Internet, 18 December 2005. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html.
Clark-Sestak, Susan L. U.S. Bases in Central Asia.
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2003.
Crook, Clive. “Our Faith-Based Future.” The Atlantic
Monthly. 296. no. 5. December 2005. n.p. On-line. Internet, 20
December 2005. Available from
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/faith-based-future.
Foreign exchange markets. BIS 75th annual report.
Bank for International Settlements, 2005. On-line Internet, 26
October 2005. Available from
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2005e5.pdf.
Friedman, Thomas L. The World is Flat: A Brief History of the
Twenty-First Century. New York, N.Y.: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2005.
Goodman, Peter S. “China Invests Heavily In Sudan’s Oil
Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers.” The
Washington Post, 23 December 2004. On-line. Internet, 1 January
2006. Available from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html.
Honeycutt, Dean. “Those ‘evil’ currency traders.”
World & I, March 98. On-line. EBSCOHost, 14 November
2005.
“How China runs the world economy.” The Economist, 28
July 2005. On-line. Internet, 8 December 2005. Available from
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4223552.
Information office of the State Council People’s Republic of
China, China’s National Defense in 2004. Beijing, 2004.
On-line. Internet 20 December 2005. Available from
http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/.
Isenberg, David “How Russia keeps China armed.” Asia
Times, 19 November 2004. On-line Internet, 27 December 2005,
available from http://atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FK19Ag02.html.
Jisi, Wang “China’s Search for Stability With America.”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, 84 no. 5.
Khalilzad, Zalmay M. Sweet and Sour: Recipe for a New China
Policy, RAND, no date available. On-line. Internet, 22 December
2005. Available from www.rand.org/.webloc.
Krugman, Paul. “The China Syndrome.” New York Times.
5 September 2003.
Kuijs, Louis. Investment and Saving in China. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3633. Beijing, China: World Bank,
2005.
Lague, David. “Coming to terms with China’s ascent.”
International Herald Tribune. 7 November 2005. On-line
Internet, 14 December 2005. Available from
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/06/news/rchinover.php.
Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing:
PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999.
Mandel, Ernest. Beyond Perestroika: The Future of Gorbachev’s
USSR. Edited and translated by Gus Fagan, New York: Verso, 1989.
Neustadt, Richard E. Alliance Politics. New York, N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 1970.
Pala, Christopher. “China eyes share of Kazakh oil: Canada
judge OKs bid for fields.” The Washington Times.
On-line. EBSCOhost, 19 December 2005.
Paret, Peter. “Clausewitz.” In Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter
Paret, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
RAND Study Predicts China’s Defense Spending is Lower Than
Previous Outside Estimates. RAND Corp.. 2005. On-line Internet,
21 December 2005. Available from
http://www.rand.org/news/press.05/05.19.html.
Ross, Robert S. “Assessing the China Threat.” National
Interest, Fall 2005. On-line. EBSCOHost, 24 October 2005.
“Shanghai Cooperative Organization.” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. On-line
Internet, 19 December 2005, Available from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Edited and translated by J. H. Haung
New York N.Y.: Quill, 2000.
“Suppression, China, Oil.” The Economist, 7 July
2005. On-line. Internet, 19 December 2005. Available from
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4158711
“The great thrift shift.” The Economist, 22
September 2005. On-line. Internet, 21 December 2005. Available from
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_QQTRPNR&no_na_tran=1.
“The military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2005.” Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress,
2005. On-line Internet, 23 December 2005. Available from
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.
US China Commission. United States-China Relations and Strategic
Perceptions. USCC Testimony, 2001. On-line Internet, 26 October
2005. Available from
http://www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/teswor.htm.
US House. China’s Strategic Intentions and Goals: Hearing
before the House Committee of Armed Services. 106th
Cong., 2nd sess., 2000.
Weir, Fred. “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO of the
East’.” The Christian Science Monitor, 26 October
2005. On-line Internet, 26 October 2005. Available from
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1026/p04s01-woeu.htm.
Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for
Energy.” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005.
